Different modeling techniques have been proposed in the literature to solve the issue of amplification in response to shocks in Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. This paper analyzes the impact of variable capital utilization on the amplification mechanism of productivity shocks. It builds a DSGE model which includes a link between capital utilization and shiftworking, consistently with the empirical literature. This paper shows that capital utilization cannot be the main mechanism which amplifies the effects of the shocks hitting the economy.

Gertler and Karadi combined financial intermediation and unconventional 'monetary policy' in a DSGE framework. We estimate their model with UK data using Bayesian techniques. To validate the fit of the estimatedDSGE model, we evaluate the model's empirical properties. Then, we analyse the transmission mechanism of the shocks, set to produce a downturn. Finally, we examine the empirical importance of nominal, real and financial frictions and of different shocks. We find that banking friction seems to play an important role in explaining the UK business cycle. Moreover, the banking sector shock seems to explain about half of the fall in real GDP in the recent crisis. A credit supply shock seems to account for most of the weakness in bank lending.

This paper studies how fiscal policy affects loan market conditions in the United States. First, it conducts a structural vector-autoregression analysis showing that the bank spread responds negatively to an expansionary government spending shock, while lending increases. Second, it illustrates that these results are mimicked by a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the bank spread is endogenized via the inclusion of a banking sector exploiting lending relationships. Third, it shows that lending relationships represent a friction that generates a financial accelerator effect in the transmission of the fiscal shock.

This study analyzes the impact of the speed of transition reforms on economic growth in transition countries in the context of the debate on ‘big-bang vs. gradualist approach’. It builds a new indicator for the speed of transition reforms based on a three-way principal component analysis. It shows that: (i) the speed of transition reforms Granger-causes economic growth and there is no reverse causation; (ii) the impact of contemporaneous speed of transition reforms on economic growth is negative, but becomes positive in the longer horizon; and (iii) other factors, such as initial conditions and macroeconomic stabilization programmes, also drive economic growth. Although the first two results are robust to different estimators, the impact of control variables depends on the econometric specification.

Questo capitolo si propone di classificare i possibili conflitti di interesse nei mercati finanziari distinguendo tra: (i) conflitti di interesse tra manager e azionisti; (ii) conflitti di interesse nelle banche, in particolare nelle banche d'investimento e nelle banche universali; e (iii) conflitti di interesse in altri "controllori delegati". Discute poi due possibili procedure con le quali gestire i problemi di conflitto di interessi: (i) il ricorso a specifici schemi di incentivo; e (ii) l'attività di monitoraggio, per esempio l'intervento da parte di un'autorità di supervisione.