In this paper we analyze the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in Banerjee’s model of herd behavior. Changing one assumption we obtain three important results: players’ strategies are parameter dependent; an incorrect herd could be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible.

This experimental study investigates insurance decisions in low-probability, high-loss risk situations. Results indicate that subjects consider the probability of loss (loss size) when they make buying decisions (paying decisions). Most individuals are risk averse with no specific threshold probability.

In this paper we analyse the empirical performance of several preference functionals using individual and group data. Our investigation aims to address two fundamental questions that have, until now, not been addressed in literature. Specifically, we intend to assess if there exists a risky choice theory that statistically fits group decisions significantly better than alternative theories, and if there are significant differences between individual and group choices. Experimental findings reported in this paper provide answers to both questions showing that when risky choices are undertaken by small groups (dyads in our case), disappointment aversion outperforms several alternative preference functionals, including expected utility. Since expected utility typically emerged as the dominant model in individual risky choices, this finding suggests that differences between individual and group choices exist, showing that the preference aggregation process drives out EU.

This paper aims at providing an overview of several topics that have been addressed in the field of experimental asset markets. Rather than being exhaustive in any single topic, this review is meant to gather the several research strands, and to provide a powerful picture of the main advances in the use of experimental techniques for the study of financial markets.

This experimental study investigates insurance decisions in low-probability, high-loss risk situations. Results indicate that subjects consider the probability of loss (loss size) when they make buying decisions (paying decisions). Most individuals are risk averse with no specific threshold probability.

This paper presents a game theoretic morphological analysis of the U.S. environmental authorities’ (i.e., EPA and DOJ) behavioural mechanisms, based on strategic interactions among the players. The models explore the role of discretion that such authorities enjoy, either in deciding how to pursue environmental violations (investigative and prosecutorial discretion) or in judging them (judicial discretion). The purpose is to identify both the optimal firms’ behaviour in terms of compliance, and the DOJ’s and EPA’s optimal strategies in terms of enforcement actions to undertake. Consistent with the setting of the game theory models, the role of EPA and DOJ in deterring firms from polluting is, then, empirically tested, by means of a laboratory experiment. Laboratory evidence on compliance behaviour of firms when faced with enforcement conditions predicted by the theoretical models set up is discussed for the different experimental treatments performed.

Different from previous experiments that used three representations of uncertain information for probabilities: best estimate, interval and sets of probabilities, we use visual display to represent different levels of uncertainty through varying amount of probabilistic information provided to subjects. Results confirm that the individuals’ willingness to pay is higher when a larger amount of information is available. Further, individuals are found uncertainty averse for high probability of gain and uncertainty seekers for low probability of gain. Similarities in results across different representations of uncertainty indicate that the representation tested here is a viable method for communicating uncertainty to decision makers.

Food security, along with growing population and the associated environmental concerns, make food waste and loss a central topic in economic analysis. While food losses occur mostly at the production, postharvest and processing phases of the supply chain, food waste takes place mainly at the end of the chain and therefore concerns primarily the habits and behaviour patterns of retailers and consumers. Many solutions and practices have been proposed and oftentimes implemented in order to “keep food out of landfills”, thus reducing food waste at the source. However, little attention has been paid to the possible sharing of consumer-side food surplus. In this context, food sharing could represent an effective way to tackle food waste at the consumers' level, with both environmental and economic potential positive effects. However, there is still little empirical evidence testing the effectiveness of introducing sharing economy approaches to reduce food waste. This study seeks to fill this gap through a framed field experiment. The authors performed two experimental treatments; in the control treatment students were asked to behave according to their regular food consumption habits, and in the food sharing treatment the same students were instructed to purchase food, cook and consume it collectively. Preliminary results showed that the adoption of food sharing practices by households do not automatically translate into food waste reduction. A number of factors, were evident from a quali-quantitative analysis of the sample (i.e. environmentally friendly behaviour, economic awareness, domestic skills and collaborative behaviors) might act as ‘enablers’ to make sharing practices more effective. The replication of our study at a larger scale will allow further investigation of the relevance of the identified enablers in order to unlock the full potential of food sharing practices.

Over recent years, parking policy has become a key element of urban transport policy and planning in many countries. The need of urban mobility, mostly guaranteed by private cars, in facts, impacts on the policy and regulations of parking areas. The issue is particularly relevant for work related regular trips. Workers have an inelastic demand for parking spaces and limited alternatives to private transport. Often working places have a car parking area to satisfy workers needs but when this is not provided, it implicitly conditions workers? behaviours. The aim of this research is to analyse the trade-off between parking space availability and cost, in terms of time savings (considering time in terms of foregone earnings). This information is pivotal when designing parking policies in terms of fares, investments and regulation. The cost-opportunity of saving time, having information on the availability of slots closer to the working place, is conditioned by the worker?s income and earnings. Since the pivotal work of Axhausen and Polak (1991), a relevant body of literature has focused on parking behaviour, measuring many different dimensions in terms of travellers? choice of parking type and location. However, the little attention has been devoted to understand how risk and uncertainty influence drivers? behaviours in parking decision. This paper presents two studies addressing this issue. Both aims to collect disaggregate data on travellers? responses to changes in parking attributes and related information. Different components of the parking activity (e.g., general in-vehicle time, parking search time, egress time) are controlled for, in relation to the characteristics of the respondent. In order to avoid heterogeneity in relation to journey purposes we focus on workers? mobility. The first study is carried out using a standard stated preference approach; the second is carried out in a laboratory through the set up of an experiment. The collected data is used to build simple model of consumer?s choice related to parking decision, taking explicitly into consideration both risk and uncertainty. Laboratory?s results are compared to the field-experiment?s outcome in order to identify potential significant differences and, where possible, with existing revealed and stated preference results.

This paper provides an experimental test of the traveller’s dilemma using individual and group data. Our investigation aims to address three fundamental research questions, which can be summarised as follows: (i) claims are affected by the size of the penalty/reward; (ii) individual decisions differ significantly from group decisions; (iii) individual claims are affected by the induction of a focal point a là Schelling. Experimental findings reported in this paper provide answers to each of these questions showing that: (i) although the size of the penalty/reward did not affect subject choices in the first-period, it played a key role in determining subjects’ behaviour in the repeated game; (ii) overall, groups behave more rationally, in the sense that they were always closer to the Nash equilibrium; (iii) the reference point did not encourage coordination around the Pareto optimal choice.

We provide an experimental test of the traveler's dilemma using individual and group data. Our investigation aims to assess whether individual decisions differ significantly from group decisions. Experimental findings reported in this paper show that: (1) groups are always more rational – i.e. their claims are closer to the Nash equilibrium; (2) the size of the penalty/reward influences convergence to the equilibrium both when decisions are taken individually or in groups; and (3) groups are more sensitive to the size of the penalty/reward.

This paper purports to provide some evidence on the effect of rating agencies in financial markets. By means of a laboratory experiment, we investigate the effect and interaction between private and public information. We reached two conclusions: (1) indeed, the rating agency can speed up price convergence, (2) but not always to the fundamental price.

The main advantages of a laboratory financial market with respect to field data are: (i) it allows us a perfect monitoring of the available information to each subject at any moment in time, and (ii) it gives us the possibility of recording subjects' trading activity in the market. In our experimental design the information distribution is endogenous, since the subjects can buy costly private information. Inspired by the debate on the role of rating agencies in the recent financial crisis, additional to the private information we introduce an imperfect public signal. The study of the interplay between public and private information constitutes our contribution to the experimental literature on laboratory financial markets. In particular, in this paper we study the perturbation created by the introduction of a public signal on the information acquisition process and on the price efficiency in transmitting information. We conclude that the public signal might drive the market price if private information is not of good quality, leaving the financial market in “the hands" of the institution which releases the public information.