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Mauro Romano
Ruolo
Professore Ordinario
Organizzazione
Università degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro
Dipartimento
Economia e Finanza
Area Scientifica
AREA 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare
SECS-P/07 - Economia Aziendale
Settore ERC 1° livello
Non Disponibile
Settore ERC 2° livello
Non Disponibile
Settore ERC 3° livello
Non Disponibile
Although excluded from the scope of IFRS 3, business combinations under common control (BCUCCs) are widespread transactions that take place all over the world in different forms, often as a reorganization or restructuring among related parties. These transactions occur when entities are ultimately - not transiently - controlled by the same party/ies before and after the combination (neither a capital market nor an arm’s length transaction and devoid of economic substance: indeed, no change of control occurs). The scarce and fragmentary literature, not to mention the lack of clear consensus on the topic, contributes to the prevailing concerns on how to account for BCUCCs. In this complex context, the purpose of this work is to assess the possible and various accounting methods and identify the most suitable, accredited and consistent techniques.
The present study aims at shedding further light on theoretical basis for the application of minority discount. Starting from the value of control, it focuses on the role of minority discount in business valuation; this paper takes into account the importance of ownership structure. Scholars and practitioners investigated the value of control and several measures for control premium have been developed. However, the matter of control is a relevant issue not only for corporate governance but also, and especially, for business valuation. On one hand, the controlling shareholder may have incentive to deviate from total wealth maximization by extracting private benefit of control; if this is the case, the application of control premium is strictly recommended. On the other hand, in presence of such controlling shareholder, minorities could potentially be excluded from governance, leaving them with no decision power. This condition has a direct impact in term of economic value of pro-quota equity. Whether or not minority discount should be applied is still an open question. Another issue concerns the economic basis to which the discount should refer. From a theoretical standpoint, this paper is a first attempt to systematize the theoretical foundations of the cited discount. Its main contribution is the clarification of the standard values related to minority discount and the relative shareholder levels. The present paper compares the evolution of Italian studies with the American doctrine and provides a comprehensive reconciliation among different standards; last, an inclusive review of control premium and discount for lack of marketability is provided.
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