Over the past generation, family law in the United States has changed enormously, as has the in-stitution of the family itself. In the United States, a significant shift in the location of political and legal authority over family life has accompanied the transformation of family law. Until recently, family law was viewed as the province of state governments. In the tradition of dual federalism, states were sovereign in this area, and the national government played a relatively minor role. Over the past thirty years, however, this aspect of the American federalist tradition has also been trans-formed. Family law in the United States today is a complex mixture of state and federal law.

Il contributo di sir John Fortescue alla costruzione della teoria del governo misto inglese e d il suo ruolo nella Common law

La Corte di Lussemburgo ha affermato che il diritto UE si oppone ad una legislazione nazionale la quale, con l’introduzione di una procedura incidentale di controllo di costituzionalità delle leggi di tipo “prioritario”, abbia l’effetto di impedire ai giudici nazionali di assicurare l’immediata efficacia del diritto comunitario e di limitare la possibilità di adire la Corte di giustizia con rinvio pregiudiziale. La Corte di Lussemburgo ha inoltre considerato come, in effetti, l’art. 78-2, quarto comma, del codice penale francese, si ponga in contrasto con la disciplina europea Schengen sulla libertà di circolazione delle persone (e conseguentemente con l’impegno alla eliminazione dei controlli sulle stesse alle frontiere interne), con ciò dando effettivo corpo al problema sollevato dalla Cour de Cassation attinente alla contestualità di un dubbio di costituzionalità e di convenzionalità. Ciononostante il giudice comunitario ha affermato che spetta al giudice del rinvio verificare se la normativa nazionale di cui si discute, e dunque la legge organica, possa essere interpretata in modo conforme a quanto richiesto dal diritto comunitario (così come in effetti già fatto dal Conseil Consitutionnel).

In United States v. Windsor of 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared the constitutional illegitimacy of the first part of DOMA where the Congress put a definition of the institution of marriage for the federal law, as exclusively heterosexual union. This act has been adopted in order to exclude couples eventually merged into a same-sex marriage from the possible advantages (tax, health care, etc..), which stem from federal legislation. In the same decision, the Court also ruled that the distinction on the basis of sexual orientation by rules of ordinary rank is eligible to trigger the use by the court of the strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has not spoken openly about the first part of DOMA which provides that Member States of the Federation are not required to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated in other states; this regulatory provision, however, following the decision of Windsor, presents important profiles of unconstitutionality too. The first part of the DOMA 1996 was adopted on the basis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause which is provided for in the Article IV Section I of the U.S. Federal Constitution and which states: “In every State shall be allocated the full faith and full credit to the acts, access to public documents and the judicial proceedings of other states; And the Congress may by general acts prescribe the manner in which the validity of such acts, records and proceedings must be determined and the effects of validity itself. “ In Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 1935, the Supreme Court put in evidence the “unifying” purpose of this clause The paper aims to reconstruct the Congress misuse of this clause which was adopted to ensure the validity of acts and judgments throughout the federation and was used instead by the Congress as constitutional legitimation to adopt a legislation to ensure Member States from the obligation to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated in other states.

Analisi storica e giurisprudenziale e valutazione del rapporto dialettico fra la dottrina dell' Absolute immunity in relazione alla responsabilità civile del magistrato nell'esperienza statunitense e il principio del due process of law

The appointment of a Supreme Court Justice is an event of major significance in American Politics. The “Appointments Clause” (Article II, Section 2, clause 2) states that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court.” Over the course of more than two centuries, the Supreme Court appointment process has undergone important changes, while remaining constant in other key respects. Actually, the process of appointing Justices has undergone changes over two centuries. For examples, although not mentioned in the Constitution, an important role is played midway in the process (after the President selects, but before the Senate considers) by the Senate Judiciary Committee; in another major change from earlier practice, there are now many more participants in the Supreme Court appointment process. The more exacting standard usually applied to Supreme Court nominations reflects the special importance of the Court, coequal to and independent of the Presidency and Congress.