The effects of union bargaining power and trade liberalization on industry selection are analysed within a two-country heterogeneous-firm model with firm-specific unions and inter-country asymmetries in size and union power. Union bargaining power is shown to have more nuanced effects on efficiency and welfare than what typically suggested by conventional wisdom. While the higher wages resulting from an unfavourable union power differential harm firms' competitiveness, by reinforcing standard market access mechanisms, they give rise to aggregate demand effects that can act as a catalyst for industry and result in a pro-variety effect.

We provide novel insights on the decentralization of optimal outcomes under monopolistic competition with non-separable utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous firm heterogeneity. Relative to the uncostrained optimum, equilibrium firm selection is too weak, average firm size is too small, low-cost firms are too small and high-cost firms are too large. The unconstrained optimum can be decentralized through differentiated production subsidies to producers financed through lump-sum taxes on entrants and consumers. When differentiated subsidies and transfers from entrants are not viable, the constrained optimum can be decentralized through a common production subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax on consumers.

After some decades of relative oblivion, the interest in the optimality properties of monopolistic competition has recently re-emerged due to the availability of an appropriate and parsimonious framework to deal with firm heterogeneity. Within this framework we show that non-separable utility, variable demand elasticity and endogenous firm heterogeneity cause the market equilibrium to err in many ways, concerning the number of products, the size and the choice of producers, the overall size of the monopolistically competitive sector. More crucially with respect to the existing literature, we also show that the extent of the errors depends on the degree of firm heterogeneity. In particular, the inefficiency of the market equilibrium is largest when selection among heterogenous firms is needed most, that is, when there are relatively many firms with low productivity and relatively few firms with high productivity.

We analyze how increases in the market size and in the level of international integration affect the process of selection among firms with heterogeneous productivity levels when they are interconnected by vertical linkages. We show that when vertical linkages among firms are relatively weak (strong), an increase in the market size softens (toughens) the competition facing firms in this market and more firms of a lower (higher) efficiency survive, increasing (decreasing) the welfare level. Moreover, an increase in the level of economic integration softens competition only for intermediate vertical linkages, worsening the welfare level only for strong linkages.

This paper studies the labor market impacts of trade liberalization, and specifically tariff reductions, with a focus on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in presence of vertical linkages in the fixed costs of production. To that purpose, we develop and empirically test a monopolistic competition model with variable elasticity of substitution and labor differentiated by skill level, where skilled workers are the residual claimants of savings on imported inputs. Consistently with the model predictions, we find that a 10% reduction in tariffs implies on average a 3.8% increase in the wage gap. In addition, the same level of tariff reduction is expected to lower unskilled employment in domestic production by 3.3%, which is partially offset by an expansion of unskilled employment in the export segment of production. These results are obtained matching detailed international trade data with World Input–Output Tables and EU KLEMS data on country-sector wage by skill level on 17 OECD countries from 1996 to 2005.

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

The present paper explores the role of the social structure of suburban areas on city dynamics. We focus on relative concerns in the form of conspicuous consumption and introduce them into a standard economic geography model a la Krugman. We show that the level of social integration within the suburban areas of cities and the level of economic integration across cities are crucial in determining the city sizes. An interesting case arises with moderate trade costs when relatively small shares of income are devoted to the consumption of the differentiated good: if classes of workers are segregated (as in homogenous suburban areas), relative concerns tend to generate dispersed, medium-size cities; when workers of different classes socially interact, relative concerns contribute to foster socially integrated megalopolises. This result shows that keeping-up-with-the-Joneses motives may generate counterintuitive results when agents are able to choose their location.