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Alessandro Cirillo
Ruolo
Ricercatore a tempo determinato - tipo A
Organizzazione
Università degli Studi di Foggia
Dipartimento
Dipartimento di Economia
Area Scientifica
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare
SECS-P/07 - Economia Aziendale
Settore ERC 1° livello
Non Disponibile
Settore ERC 2° livello
Non Disponibile
Settore ERC 3° livello
Non Disponibile
Initial public offerings make a noteworthy contribution to both the growth of equity markets and the promotion of entrepreneurial activities. As a strategic issue, the decision on when to go public depends on the firm’s leader, and the personal characteristics of chief executives (CEOs) have been found to affect the results of the initial public offering. This paper investigates whether the speed with which firms go public depends on the CEO’s time to retirement, the so-called career horizon. Hypothesising that CEOs with short career horizons will be more risk-averse and aim to preserve their legacy, we found that CEO career horizon is negatively related to the time the firm takes to start the initial public offering. CEOs with longer career horizons make faster, more risky decisions, such as to go public, because of their risk-taking preferences. We also examined how the extent of CEO power affects this relationship. Our results show that a low level of power is linked to more risky decisions, so that powerful CEOs tend to be associated with taking longer to reach the point of initial public offering.
The paper aims to test the impact of CEO role on IPO value in family owned firms. We impose two criteria to define family firms: family involvement in the Top Management Team and family ownership. Based on unique, hand-collected, dataset we test our hypotheses on firms went public on Milano Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2011. We make inference on 77 family-owned firms and we measure IPO value from an outside investors’ perspective. Within an agency framework, we examine several CEO characteristics, namely: CEO family, CEO duality and CEO founder. Our results suggest that having a family member as CEO negatively affects IPO value: investors may anticipate the increasing of agency costs. This paper shed light into how pre-IPO governance can influence firm value.
This article aims to assess the current situation and the evolution of the literature on the role of top-level decision-makers in initial public offerings. The article combines bibliometric and qualitative reviews of 147 articles published in 57 journals until 2015. Findings show that the debate on the role of top-level decision-makers in initial public offerings has followed an irregular pathway. Research attention has moved from studies on the actors and the dynamics of going public to a focus on the strategic implications of initial public offerings. The paper is a good starting point for future policy-making interventions designed to support top-level decision-making. By enhancing awareness of the strategic role of initial public offerings, we hope to improve the governance practices associated with them. The paper also sheds light on the importance of fostering the corporate transparency of top-level decision-making in firms going public, as an additional tool to increase investors’ trust and attract financial resources. Finally, the paper provides a comprehensive overview of the academic field, examining research trends and the evolutionary pattern. It also suggests future research avenues by identifying un(der)explored issues to advance knowledge on the topic.
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