Abstract

The paper examines the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a dy- namic context where abatement levels are associated with the stock pollutant evolution. We underline two meaningful aspects of this matter. Firstly, we consider asymmetry among coun- tries, dividing them in two types: developed countries that have a considerable environmental awareness and developing ones that pay a less attention to environmental preservation. Sec- ondly, we introduce a positive externality in the cooperation where countries coordinate their R&D activities sharing the investments in order to avoid duplication of green activities. Other- wise, the non-cooperators support completely their R&D investments for clean technologies. These two aspects encourage the formation of stable coalitions till to determine conditions for which also the grand coalition is stable.

Autore Pugliese

• Villani Giovanni

Tutti gli autori

• VILLANI G.

Titolo volume/Rivista

Non Disponibile

Anno di pubblicazione

2015

ISSN

0960-0779

ISBN

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Wos

Nessuna citazione

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

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Numero di citazioni Scopus

Non Disponibile

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

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Settori ERC

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Codici ASJC

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