Abstract

We provide theoretical foundations for quality-adjusted price-cap regulation in industries where a regulated incumbent and an unregulated entrant offer vertically differentiated products competing in price and quality. We show that, whether or not the incumbent anticipates the reaction of the entrant, the optimal weights in the cap depend upon the market served by the entrant, despite the latter not being directly concerned by regulation. We further show that the cap is robust to small errors in the weights. Our findings point to the conclusion that, in partially regulated industries, regulators should use information about the whole sectors rather than on the sole regulated incumbents.

Autore Pugliese

• Bergantino Angela Stefania , Vinella Annalisa

Tutti gli autori

• BERGANTINO A.S.;VINELLA A.

Titolo volume/Rivista

Non Disponibile

Anno di pubblicazione

2011

ISSN

1097-3923

ISBN

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Wos

Nessuna citazione

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Scopus

5

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

Non Disponibile

Settori ERC

Non Disponibile

Codici ASJC

Non Disponibile