Abstract

The story of public policies and urban development plans is characterized by continuous deals, is affected by an dynamic institutional counterbalance among actors, a political re-formulation of actions that relevantly reduce the affordability of forecasts of success. The interaction among different actors affects the designed path of change, and the negotiation can change strategies, can accelerate or delay pieces of the predicted urban development and consequently modify the flow of positive/negative economic effect, according to the prevalence of one actor on the other inside the different step of the process. Since game theory to perspective theory economic literature describes each actor as afraid of losing the advantage obtained in a process, even in the case of urban transformation when another manages to get one more for himself. The relationship between major advantage of someone and less advantage of some other is relevant when two parties are in competition each other. In this paper a weighting system is applied to actors’ view of reciprocal i8mportance, trying to understand who is going to affect more effectively the bargaining in a complex urban development process.

Autore Pugliese

• Torre Carmelo Maria

Tutti gli autori

• Torre C , Fusco Girard L

Titolo volume/Rivista

LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE

Anno di pubblicazione

2012

ISSN

0302-9743

ISBN

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Wos

Nessuna citazione

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Scopus

16

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

2017-04-22 03:20:59

Settori ERC

Non Disponibile

Codici ASJC

Non Disponibile