Abstract

The main claim of this paper is that Wittgenstein’s concern about the Inner is a highly stratified and complex one. It is indeed so to such an extent, that - if we tend to favor only a single interpretative version of it - we commit the error of a rough reductionism (exactly what Wittgenstein tried to avoid at all levels). First of all, Wittgenstein’s attempt is not that of denying (the reality of) the Inner , but that of clarifying the very nature of the concepts related to it: it is undeniable that we can talk about even our most private experiences, and that others can understand us. From Wittgenstein’s point of view then, language can be also used so that we can, through it, indeed give expression to our deepest feelings, among other things: the Inner cannot consequently be interpreted neither as a completely homogeneous dimension of private experience(s), nor as something which is ineffable. On the contrary, it can be seen as a network of concepts relating the Inner and the Outer in multifarious and possibly ever-changing ways. By stressing in this way the deep, and multifarious, criterial link between the Inner and the Outer, we evidently find that it would turn out very hard to accuse Wittgenstein of reductionism. Thus, if we try to solve questions concerning the Inner aiming at an ultimate solution, we are on the wrong way from a methodological and a substantive point of view, for, as suggested by Wittgenstein, it would amount to seeing philosophy “as if it were divided into (infinite) longitudinal strips instead of into (finite) cross strips”.

Autore Pugliese

• Rizzo Giorgio

Tutti gli autori

• G. Rizzo

Titolo volume/Rivista

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Anno di pubblicazione

2012

ISSN

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ISBN

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Numero di citazioni Wos

Nessuna citazione

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Numero di citazioni Scopus

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Settori ERC

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Codici ASJC

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