Abstract

This paper considers an electoral equilibrium between two party coalitions. Each coalition is composed of two factions called activists and opportunists. Activists are interested in announcing a policy as close as possible to their ideal policy and are ready to contribute with vital electoral resources to the belonging party coalition. Opportunists are interested only in winning elections and need the activists’ contributions to enhance their party valence. Thus, the two factions of each coalition negotiate on both policy platform and activists’ contributions. Results show that, in equilibrium, the marginal rates of substitution between policy position and activists’ contributions must be the same for the two negotiating factions inside party coalitions. Furthermore, greater activism inside parties leads to policy divergence.

Autore Pugliese

• Giuranno Michele Giuseppe

Tutti gli autori

• GIURANNO M. G.

Titolo volume/Rivista

ECONOMIA DELLE SCELTE PUBBLICHE

Anno di pubblicazione

2013

ISSN

1120-7019

ISBN

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Wos

Nessuna citazione

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

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Numero di citazioni Scopus

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Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

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Settori ERC

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Codici ASJC

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