Abstract

The paper focuses on the relationship between abuses of dominance and information sharing as it arises from the reading of EU, Italian and US case law. Firstly, it remarks how informational monopolists (or super-dominant firms) may infringe competition law in three different ways (they are the “informational abuses”): i) through actual or constructive refusals to exchange information; ii) through the misuse of information provided to public regulators performing some pro-competitive regulatory procedures; and iii) through collusion to provide misleading information (outside a regulatory procedure). Secondly, it points out that many Article 102 of the Tfeu (or homologous norms in other jurisdictions) cases are adjudicated via remedies imposing an exchange of information. Such behavioral remedies resemble much traditional regulation, as regards the rationale of intervention, the institutional resources employed and the powers exercised. As a consequence, we suggest to call them “para-regulatory” remedies, distinguishing them from pure, traditional regulatory interventions. In particular, these para-regulatory remedies can conflict not only with the already existing information based regulation, but also with the traditional suspicious approach that antitrust law takes when it comes to transparency and Article 101 of the Tfeu (or conspiracy rules).

Autore Pugliese

• Di Porto Fabiana

Tutti gli autori

• f. di porto

Titolo volume/Rivista

CONCORRENZA E MERCATO

Anno di pubblicazione

2014

ISSN

1720-2698

ISBN

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Wos

Nessuna citazione

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

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Numero di citazioni Scopus

Non Disponibile

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

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Settori ERC

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Codici ASJC

Non Disponibile