Abstract

We investigate both quantity and price competition in two differentiated oligopolistic frameworks in which firms are heterogeneous with respect to the ownership structure, i.e. managerial firms compete against entrepreneurial firms, or to the timing decisions, i.e. leaders compete against followers. We show the circumstances under which delegation and sequential strategies, shown to be equivalent under unilateral delegation (Vickers, The Economic Journal, Vol. 95 (1985), pp. 138–147), enable firms to out-perform their rivals and create scope for welfare gains. The different effects of changes in market structure and the degree of product substitutability on firms’ profitability and social welfare are discussed. Codice Scopus: 2-s2.0-84862682963

Autore Pugliese

• Scrimitore Marcella

Tutti gli autori

• Scrimitore M.

Titolo volume/Rivista

MANCHESTER SCHOOL

Anno di pubblicazione

2013

ISSN

1463-6786

ISBN

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Wos

2

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

28/04/2018

Numero di citazioni Scopus

2

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

28/04/2018

Settori ERC

Non Disponibile

Codici ASJC

Non Disponibile