Le mythe du cartésianisme d'Elisabeth
Abstract
The paper offers a diachronic analysis on the correspondence between Descartes and Princess Elizabeth on the question of the mind-body union. From the one side, I assume that Descartes, in his letter of May, 21 1643 has been the very first interpreter of Elisabeth’s account of the mind. He thinks that Elisabeth accepts his own doctrine of the real distinction and that Elizabeths’ difficulty in explaining the interaction between mind and body originates from the very fact that the Princess has ‘too much’ absorbed the thesis of the real distinction. I argue, therefore, that if it has been possible to speak (Gouhier, Alquié, etc.) of a ‘Cartesianism’ of Elizabeth, this is just because it was Descartes himself who created this label. From the other side, I show that Descartes’s interpretation of Elizabeth account of the mind develops during the correspondence: indeed, in his letter to Elisabeth of June, 28, far from attributing to Elizabeth the doctrine of the real distinction, he openly criticizes the Princess’ attempt to attribute the extension to the soul. In other words, far from affirming that Elizabeth has too much distinguished between mind and body, now Descartes claims that she has confused them. Therefore, I formulate the two following conclusions : 1) Elizabeth has never been a ‘cartesian’ thinker ; more than this, what she sketches in her correspondence with Descartes is a materialistic account of the soul ; 2) Descartes’ account of the thesis the union between mind and body evolves during his correspondence with Elisabeth : if in his first letter he thinks that the union can be explained by the example of the gravity, that makes possible to think together both the union and the distinction, in his second letter he affirms that the union can be grasped only « en usant seulement de la vie et des conversations ordinaires». This means that it is impossible to think at the same moment the union and the distinction.
Anno di pubblicazione
2014
ISSN
Non Disponibile
ISBN
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Numero di citazioni Wos
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Numero di citazioni Scopus
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Settori ERC
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Codici ASJC
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