Abstract

We study a distributed allocation process where, at each time, every player i) proposes a new bid based on the average utilities produced up to that time, ii) adjusts such allocations based on the inputs received from its neighbors, and iii) generates and allocates new utilities. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allocations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that makes the grand coalition stable.

Autore Pugliese

• Notarstefano Giuseppe

Tutti gli autori

• Bauso D. , Notarstefano G.

Titolo volume/Rivista

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL

Anno di pubblicazione

2015

ISSN

0018-9286

ISBN

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Wos

Nessuna citazione

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Scopus

3

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

28/04/2018

Settori ERC

Non Disponibile

Codici ASJC

Non Disponibile