Abstract

We consider a differentiated duopoly and endogenise the firm choice of the strategy variable (price or quantity) to play on the product market in the presence of network externalities. We model this choice by assuming both competition between entrepreneurial (owner-managed) firms and competition between managerial firms in which market decisions are delegated from owners to revenue-concerned managers. While network externalities are shown not to alter the symmetric equilibrium quantity choice arising in the no-delegation case, sufficiently strong network effects allow us to eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria under delegation and lead to a unique equilibrium in which both firms choose price.

Autore Pugliese

• Scrimitore Marcella , Chirco Alessandra

Tutti gli autori

• Chirco A. , Scrimitore M.

Titolo volume/Rivista

ECONOMICS LETTERS

Anno di pubblicazione

2013

ISSN

0165-1765

ISBN

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Wos

23

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

28/04/2018

Numero di citazioni Scopus

27

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

28/04/2018

Settori ERC

Non Disponibile

Codici ASJC

Non Disponibile