Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of the board monitoring$backslash$nrole on specific loan portfolio quality measures in banks (default$backslash$nrate, recovery rate and provisioning rate). We use a sample comprises$backslash$na totality of Italian-based banks, listed at Borsa Italiana SpA in$backslash$n2006-2008 and a number of accounting proxies to express the loan$backslash$nportfolio quality of a bank. The results of the analysis show an$backslash$noverall weakness of the board role (expressed by Independents and$backslash$nAudit Committee on board) in monitoring loan portfolio quality of$backslash$nthe bank, with the subsequent damage of the interests of stakeholders.$backslash$nA positive contribution of board monitoring, even if partial, is$backslash$nhighlighted in two cases: Independents seems improve recovery rate,$backslash$nwhile the Audit committee enhances provisioning rate in banks. With$backslash$nreference to default rate, a total negative effect of board monitoring$backslash$nis reported. On the base of implications are proposed. these results,$backslash$nsome managerial

Autore Pugliese

• Stefanelli Valeria

Tutti gli autori

• V. Stefanelli , M. Cotugno

Titolo volume/Rivista

ACADEMY OF BANKING STUDIES JOURNAL

Anno di pubblicazione

2012

ISSN

1939-2230

ISBN

Non Disponibile

Numero di citazioni Wos

9

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

25/04/2018

Numero di citazioni Scopus

4

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

26/04/2018

Settori ERC

Non Disponibile

Codici ASJC

Non Disponibile