Abstract

During the long years of the Euro-crisis, the European Central Bank (hereinafter ECB) played (and still plays) a really significant role to support states in crisis or banks facing lack of liquidity. As a consequence, it has been accused in the political, but also academic debate to exceed its own powers. First of all, the allegations were related to the scarce respect of its own legal framework (competences and limits established by the EU Treaties); secondly, they regarded her invasion of the field of economic policy while it had to limit its intervention to monetary policy; finally, it was pointed out how it played a too “political” role. This chapter aims to dismantle such criticisms showing how the ECB’s intervention—even if unconventional— was required by the critical moment and felt within the scope and the borders of monetary policy. Finally, it will address the peculiar “political” activity of the ECB, which is a technocratic institution inevitably called to exercise a discretion within the range of multiple policy options. Its freedom of judgment has to be grounded and duly motivated on economic reasoning, relating it to price stability. Nonetheless, it remains relevant.

Autore Pugliese

• Cafaro Susanna Maria

Tutti gli autori

• Cafaro S.

Titolo volume/Rivista

Non Disponibile

Anno di pubblicazione

2017

ISSN

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ISBN

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Numero di citazioni Wos

Nessuna citazione

Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

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Numero di citazioni Scopus

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Ultimo Aggiornamento Citazioni

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Settori ERC

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Codici ASJC

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